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Natural resource wars in the shadow of the future
Explaining spatial dynamics of violence during civil war
August 13, 2018
Abstract
Previous studies on natural resources and civil wars find that the presence
of natural resources increases both civil conflict risk and duration. At the
same time, belligerents often co-operate over resource extraction, suggest-
ing a temporal variation in the contest over this sub-national space. This
study argues that parties’ fight over natural resources primarily when they
expect that the conflict is about to end. In contrast, belligerents that an-
ticipate a long war will not fight in natural resource rich areas since that
will negatively influence extraction and thus provide them with less in-
come. We test our argument using yearly and monthly grid-cell level
data on African civil conflicts from 1989-2008, and find support for the
expected spatial variation- in the location where battlefield events take
place- depending on whether parties are involved in negotiations or not.
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1 Introduction
The contest over territory occupies a central position in the study of conflict
processes. A state’s ability to dominate its territory is seen as a prerequisite
for rebellion (Tilly, 1978; Fearon and Laitin, 2003) and influence the severity of
civilian victimization (Kalyvas, 2006; Wood, 2014), conflict duration (Buhaug,
Gates and Lujala, 2009), and outcome (Greig, 2015; Butcher, 2015). The ebbs
and flows of fighting also have an immediate impact on the international commu-
nity, creating vast refugee flows, posing a challenge for mediation attempts and
where to deploy peacekeepers (Walter, 1997; Cederman et al., 2013; Ruggeri,
Dorussen and Gizelis, 2016).
But a growing research agenda has noted that armed conflict does not only
consist of ‘battles’1 but also different forms of co-operation between ostensi-
bly opposed actors (Kalyvas, 2003; Christia, 2012; Mampilly, 2011; Staniland,
2017). This leads to ‘intricate and often surprising relationships between states
and non-state violent actors emerge and change within internal conflicts: main-
stream politicians build armed wings, states collaborate with militias against
common foes, police ignore private counterinsurgent armies, militaries tacitly
share sovereignty with insurgent enemies, and warlords place their loyalists in-
side state security forces’ (Staniland, 2012, 243).
A puzzling feature is that such collaboration notably often occurs in nat-
ural resource rich areas (Snyder, 2006); that are also often highly contested
(Ross, 2004b; Lujala, 2010). Indeed, one of the most prominent studies on the
resource-conflict nexus, Ross (2004a) finds occasional belligerent co-operation
in exploiting natural resources in 88% of the civil conflicts fought over resources.
Examples include Colombia and Myanmar where drug traffickers have paid off
local guerrillas, warlords and state officials to pursue their business during the
1Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) find that ‘conventional’ warfare for decades have been an
exception rather than the rule in civil wars.
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conflict (Metelits, 2009; Meehan, 2011). In Angola, UNITA rebels and army
officers were reported to have a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ to exploit diamonds on
each bank of the river in the Cuango Valley (Le Billon, 2005). In the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, the control over trade networks in diamonds, gold
and coltan was never successfully monopolized, but revenue consistently funded
different rebel and foreign armies levying taxes (Kennes, 2005).
This indicates that fighting over natural resources varies over the course of
the conflict. But what can explain these dynamics? We contend that the key
factor relates to the negative effect that intense fighting has on resource extrac-
tion. When clashes are prevalent, warring sides have to dedicate all resources to
armed action, local civilians flee the violence, which in turn decimates the work-
force and reduces the natural resource income. This subsequently undermines
belligerents ability to maintain or strengthen military capabilities, implying that
fighting over natural resources may provide short-term gains but only if fighting
is brief so as not to destroy the income from these areas.
Civil war belligerents have to pay attention both to short-term and long-term
goals when they determine their strategy. The minimum short-term goal is to
ensure that they are able to maintain the armed struggle, while the long-term
goal is to extract as many future political or economic concessions as possible
from the opponent. We argue that belligerents balance between these short-
term and long-term goals on the basis of their perceived expectation of their
own and the opponents strength to maintain fighting - i.e. perceived conflict
duration - which influences their perceived strategic importance of controlling
natural resource rich areas. When they expect conflict to continue indefinitely,
ensuring long-term survival is the main prerogative, where getting a cut of the
resource trade is more important than taking full control of the extraction.
However, when they expect that the conflict may soon be over, they will boost
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their efforts for maximizing short-term gains (Knutsen et al., 2017).
To approximate belligerents expectations about the future duration of the
conflict, we use information about whether negotiations are underway or not.
We assume that parties are more likely to expect that the conflict is closer to its
end during rather than when there are no talks. Consequently, we expect that
fighting in the vicinity of natural resources is more likely when talks are under-
way ceteris paribus. Our empirical investigation explores this argument both
on the macro-level, focusing on across-year variation, and micro-level, tracking
month-by-month changes with the onset of negotiations as a cut-off point. Our
analysis of all African civil wars 1989-2008 find less fighting in natural resource-
rich areas when conflicting parties are expecting a protracted fight. In contrast,
as belligerents expect that the conflict is about to end, remaining battle-field
action takes place primarily in areas with natural resources.
Our findings are relevant for scholars seeking to understand or predict the
dynamics of civil war violence, and constitute one of the first empirical investiga-
tions into the puzzle why enemies at times collaborate in war zones (Staniland,
2012, 2017). Further, we show that the localized risk of violence may increase
in some areas when peace talks are launched which is useful knowledge for pol-
icymakers seeking to facilitate conflict resolution, and should be considered in
decisions about where to deploy peacekeeping forces. Our study identifies where
‘spoilers’ are likely to emerge, and this information can prevent their ability to
sabotage a peace process (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis, 2017).
2 Resources, territorial control, and violence
Recent decades have witnessed vast scholarly interest in the possible correlation
of natural resources and armed conflict (Buhaug and Rød, 2006; Østby, Nord˚as
and Rød, 2009; Weidmann, 2009; Buhaug, 2010; Buhaug et al., 2011). Country-
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level studies have found mixed results between the primary commodity exports
- oil in particular - and civil war link (Ross, 2004b; Basedau and Lay, 2009;
Koubi et al., 2014), but sub-national studies have identified that the presence
of natural resources in the conflict zone correlates with longer and more violent
conflicts (Lujala, 2010; Berman et al., 2015).
The theoretical logic for how the presence of natural resources influences
conflict relates to the need of belligerents to fund their war efforts. Rulers
and rebels who trade natural resources can use the revenue income from this
source to enrich themselves or as means to buy weapons and recruit fighters
(Lichbach, 1998; Humphreys, 2005). While this makes intuitive sense, existing
studies have not considered two crucial on-the-ground features that we contend
motivate further theoretical development.
First, civil war actors do not need to fully control the natural resources
location to get access to revenue from its trade. It is both easier and more
rewarding to collect tax from extracting companies or civilians, or by organizing
the transportation of the resource to the world market. Examples of this include
the setting up of markets for the sale of coca in Peru (Weinstein, 2006), oil theft
from pipelines in Nigeria (Asuni, 2009), offering ‘licenses’ for individual diamond
miners in Sierra Leone (Le Billon, 2008), and protection rackets for companies
in Indonesian Aceh (Aspinall, 2009).
Second, intense warfare is destructive of the local environment which may
harm economic profitability. This means that increased contest over natural
resources should lead to decreased revenue and subsequently fewer resources for
warfare, thereby directly contradicting the rents-and-rebellion mechanism. It is
worth considering a competing logic regarding natural resources and incentives
for belligerents to avoid fighting, and potentially even implicitly co-operate,
as suggested by Staniland (2012). This possibility has been observed by Ross
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(2004a, 56) who concludes that ‘combatants fought for control of areas rich in
alluvial gemstones (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cambodia), drug fields and processing
plants (Peru, Burma), oil pipelines that traveled over disputed lands (Colombia,
Sudan), mines (DRC, Liberia), and commercially valuable forests (Cambodia,
Liberia). Yet in eight of these nine cases, combatants intermittently cooper-
ated in exploiting the same resources they fought over. In four cases (Sierra
Leone, Liberia, DRC, and Cambodia) there were long periods in which the ma-
jor parties more or less ceased their combat and entered a kind of commercial
equilibrium. Even in extraordinarily bitter wars such as the one in Sudan, prof-
itable alliances were often struck between groups on opposing sides-in this case,
to guard the pipeline and oilfields that the rebels had long opposed.’
In what follows, we propose a theory that emphasizes the temporal variation
of localized fighting in civil conflicts. We seek to explain why rebels sometimes
fight in natural resource rich areas, but other times avoid fighting specifically
in such territory to avoid disrupting their taxation of the trade. But what
determines these shifts between fighting and not fighting?
For studying shifts in strategy, it is necessary to consider that warring orga-
nizations have multiple aims during civil conflicts. The main aim is to ‘win’ the
conflict by defeating the opposition or at least acquiring as many concessions as
possible in a settlement. A secondary aim, however, is the need to preserve or-
ganizational capability to maintain the armed struggle, which means simply to
avoid defeat (Arreguin-Toft, 2001; Acosta, 2014). Depending on the prime ob-
jective of an actor at a given point, we argue that the strategic value of fighting
in different areas shifts. When the aim of the belligerents is to maintain fighting
capabilities, they have incentives to protect tax income and avoid fighting close
to the natural resource trade. However, when parties are seeking a decisive end
to the conflict, they have particular incentives to fight over natural resources
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because of the economic importance of these areas. Launching offensives near
resources during talks may improve the actors bargaining leverage as the nego-
tiations focus on the future division of income from these areas (Knutsen et al.,
2017).
We contend that the strategic calculation about the importance of the pri-
mary aim versus short-term survival depends on whether the long-term goal
is considered achievable in the immediate future. Thus, government and rebel
strategies are influenced by expectations about future duration of the conflict.
At the beginning of a conflict, both sides aim for a short duration and focus
all effort on the military struggle (Bapat, 2005). However, if neither side can
win quickly outright, they have to develop organizational structures to maintain
and improve their long-term fighting ability, which is facilitated by natural re-
source rents. In other words, belligerents in protracted conflicts make strategic
calculations based not only on the present contest, but also the shadow of the
future.
2.1 Long expected war duration
When belligerents expect that conflict may continue for years to come, their
most important objective is that fighting capabilities are maintained and, if
possible, strengthen. The means for doing this differ somewhat between the
regime and the rebels. A government has to consider both the threat of the
civil war and other political challengers (Roessler, 2011), meaning they have to
ensure that the state functions as efficiently as possible under the circumstances.
A state can therefore rarely focus all its capacity towards fighting, but need to
protect income that may be used for public spending or patronage for elites.
The government also needs to pay attention to the political costs of mounting
fatalities from the conflict, thus they have incentives to preserve resources until
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they perceive an opportunity to defeat the insurgents.
Rebels also consider the cost of fighting and the need to collect levies from
natural resource trade, but they have one additional objective. Rebels have to
establish control over at least some territory in the country or in a cross-border
sanctuary. This ‘safe area’ is needed for recruitment, training, recuperation,
and offers an opportunity to build institutional structures in preparation for
a future post-conflict ruling position (Mampilly, 2011). Rebel movements use
such control over territory to establish external and internal legitimacy also as
a reputation-enhancing feature when seeking support from external backers and
demand concessions from the regime (Salehyan et al., 2011). Natural resources
in this territory are advantageous, but not necessary. It is often easier to take
control over areas with little state presence and this is probably more likely
in locations without natural resources (Buhaug, 2010). Thus, in a protracted
conflict, rebels should be relatively content with control over some peripheral
territory for bases, providing they - at the same time - have access to a share
of natural resource rents in other areas. This means that only a limited part of
the rebel movement is de facto engaged in collecting natural resource taxes. In
Sierra Leone, for example, involvement in the diamond trade was largely kept
secret within the rebel group RUF and controlled by a subset of senior leaders
(Wannenburg, 2006).
The implications of these strategic calculations are that while fighting will
occur, it will be less likely in territories with natural resources. Although control
over natural resources is advantageous for the competing factions, they will also
be aware that intense fighting will diminish the value of taxes from extraction
and trade of the actual resource. The parties are also aware that trying to ad-
vance into these areas may be particularly costly as the opponents are unlikely
to retreat from these important areas. Furthermore, getting access to a share of
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natural resource rents does not necessarily mean that it needs to be conquered
in direct competition between the parties. For example, in Aceh, Indonesia, the
local military deployed their forces to collect ‘protection money’ from multina-
tional companies, while the rebel group GAM collected a monthly share of the
salaries from the employees of the same companies (Schulze, 2004; Kingsbury
and McCulloch, 2006). It is, further, even possible that the extractive busi-
ness leads to active state-insurgent cooperation. In the Democratic Republic of
Congo, for example, ‘regional strongmen did business with [government] asso-
ciates as they fought other members of that clique on a different front’ (Reno,
1997, 57).
This leads up to our first hypothesis:
H1: When belligerents expect that the conflict will continue indefinitely,
most violence will occur in areas without natural resources.
2.2 Short expected war duration
When belligerents expect that the conflict is getting closer to the end, their
strategic calculus will be substantively different. In this scenario, there are
incentives both for the warring organizations and individual commanders to
concentrate their military contest specifically to natural resource-rich areas.
Organizations that expect that the conflict is about to end will perceive
military superiority (winning), inferiority (losing), or seek peace talks (stale-
mate). A party aiming to defeat its opponent will accept a temporary set-back
in natural resource income providing it affects the weaker party more. At the
same time, the weaker party will concentrate its remaining forces to secure the
revenue it needs for rebuilding military strength. During peace talks, in or-
der to maximize parties’ bargaining leverage, they will seek to signal military
strength to get the most beneficial settlement (Walter, 2002). Since the income
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from natural resource-rich areas is of great importance both during and after
conflict, parties have incentives to ensure visible presence specifically in these
regions to gain concessions in the talks. At the same time, parties can avoid
fighting in the at-the-moment less important non-resource areas during talks to
signal restraint and commitment to the peace process.
In addition to the organizational considerations for the warring parties when
conflicts are predicted to end, individual commanders also have incentives to
direct attention towards natural resources at this point. To begin with, since
the post-conflict environment may lead to demobilization of rebel forces, this is
the last opportunity to loot. Furthermore, rebel leaders may also make plans
for institutionalizing their control over natural resources in the post-conflict
period. This objective may be particularly important in Africa where official
appointments often are intended to institutionalize patronage networks (Reno,
1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). An example of this is how Foday Sankoh, the
leader of RUF, was given the ministerial portfolio over resources in Sierra Leone
as part of the 1999 Lome peace agreement (Gberie, 2002).
Even if there is no official recognition of former commanders’ share of natural
resource rents in the post-conflict period, they may seek to maintain influence
as a strictly criminal enterprise. However, considering that the end of conflict
will shift the power resources among local actors, they have difficulties in cred-
ibly committing to upholding any collaborative war-time political orders in the
future (Kreutz, 2018). In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, there
were comprehensive reviews and re-negotiations of natural resource concessions
after the conflict in 2004 and 2007, illustrating the importance of local actors
to control these areas at the point when the fighting ends (Rustad, Lujala and
Le Billon, 2011).
All in all, this provides civil war belligerents with multiple incentives to
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seek dominance over natural resource-rich areas when they expect the conflict
is coming to a close. Capturing these territories - even if the fighting means a
temporary reduction in output - renders them with a stronger position in the
ongoing bargaining, offers opportunities for post-conflict appointments, as well
as provides them with economic resources in the post-conflict society. Simul-
taneously, the expectation that fighting will only continue for a short time will
make them more willing to accept high costs of fighting.
This leads up to our second hypothesis:
H2: When belligerents expect that the conflict is about to end, most violence
will occur in areas with natural resources.
2.3 Identifying belligerents expectations of conflict dura-
tion
To identify how the ‘shadow of the future’ influences belligerents’ strategic cal-
culations, we cannot rely on direct data. Expectations are impossible to sys-
tematically collect data on, both because they are difficult to quantify, and
because parties have incentives to bluff. We measure parties’ expected duration
of conflict through information on whether negotiations are underway or not.
We consider this a better measure than the intensity of fighting, or shifts in a
warring party size as it is unclear in what way either of these influence parties’
expectation regarding the future duration of conflict.
Table 1: Summary statistics on negotiations
Variable N Term. % term. Dur. % 1,000+ bds
No talks 268 83 31% 30.6 11%
Talks 148 65 44% 58.2 26%
Mediation 84 36 43% 71.5 33%
Peace agreement 49 24 49% 61.8 17%
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics about peace talks and how they cor-
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relate with conflict termination in our sample.2 The termination of conflict is
more common in years with talks, and even more so if these are mediated, and
in years with a peace agreement compared to years without any negotiations.
We also see that both negotiation and mediation are more common in difficult
cases, i.e. with longer duration and when fighting causes more than 1,000 bat-
tle deaths in the year, consistent with existing research (Fortna and Howard,
2008). This gives us confidence that actors are likely to consider the end of the
conflict when they participate in talks. We do not assume that peace talks are
the only way in which civil conflicts end, but that there is variation in actor
consideration of expected duration when they are involved in peace talks of not.
3 Research design
To explore the local level impact of belligerent expectations in fighting over
natural resource areas, our analysis employs the PRIO-GRID (Tollefsen, Strand
and Buhaug, 2012) structure as the unit of analysis. PRIO-GRID divides the
world into terrestrial grid-cells with 0.5 x 0.5 decimal degrees in resolution,
which constitute roughly an area of 55 x 55 kilometers at the equator. Our
study covers all African grid-cells from 1989-20083, and we use information on
battle incidence from UCDP-GED, version 1.5 (Sundberg and Melander, 2013).
We follow the UCDP-GED definition of internal armed conflict4 as violence
between state forces and an organized group with stated political incompatible
positions regarding the control of government or territory, leading to at least 25
battle-related deaths in a year (Gleditsch et al., 2002).
2Termination data from Kreutz (2010).
3Altogether 10 261 grid-cells are observed over a period of 20 years (205 220 observations),
but our negotiation variable reduces the sample to the grid-cells in country-conflict-years.
4We collapse internationalized internal and internal armed conflict into one. We use the
terminology ‘civil conflict/civil war’ interchangeably with internal armed conflict.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Fatalities 39.786 346.708 0 15143 4379
Natural resources 0.079 0.288 0 4 205220
Cell area 2.832 0.509 0 3.099 204705
Govt external 0.122 0.328 0 1 4379
Rebel external 0.016 0.125 0 1 4379
Duration 1.957 2.803 0 12.541 4379
Conflict lag 0.163 0.359 0 1 205220
Contiguity 0.167 0.137 0 0.953 199920
Capital distance 0.659 0.42 0.004 1.948 205220
Population size 0.684 1.821 0 70.124 205220
Country fatalities 0.315 1.305 0 17.356 205220
Talks 0.244 0.429 0 1 4379
Mediation 0.156 0.363 0 1 4379
Peace agreement 0.072 0.258 0 1 4379
* Variables have been scaled (/1000).
3.1 Dependent variable
Our dependent variable measures the number (‘best’ estimate) of battle-related
deaths from events in a given location. In our first analysis, these are aggregated
into a yearly estimate while our second analysis uses monthly data. To ensure
that our findings are unaffected by coding errors regarding the actual location
of an event, we restrict our sample to observations with spatial precision scores
of 1 (exact), 2 (near), and 3 (second order administrative division).5
3.2 Natural resource data
We superimpose geocoded data onto the PRIO-GRID structure using Perl code
(Pickering, 2012) to combine different natural resources into an aggregate cat-
egory.6 There is no theoretical reason to expect different effects for different
5(1) Exact location, (2) Up to 25 kms away from an exact location, (3) ADM2 indicate
areas such as a district, municipality or commune. See Sundberg and Melander (2013) and
Croicu and Kreutz (2017) for more details.
6We don’t separate between lootability and obstructability of the resource (Koubi et al.,
2014) as this does not vary over time.
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resources as belligerents will organize according to the local context, but there
may be variation with regards to the profit margin for some resources, which
could influence parties’ military strategy. This should, however, not likely co-
vary with the decisions of parties to negotiate or not and thus should not bias
our empirical analysis. We conduct additional tests to check whether the type
of natural resource matters.
Our Natural resource variable is composed of five different natural resource
categories spatially distributed as shown by Figure 17. Information on on-
shore and offshore hydrocarbon sites (oil and gas fields) consist of polygon data
from Lujala, Rød and Thieme (2007) which correspond with 851 grid cells,8
illegal drug production from Buhaug and Lujala (2005) is present in 1,573 grid-
cells.9. Finally, we use geographically coded data from Gilmore et al. (2005)
and superimpose lootable and non-lootable diamonds deposits into our grid-
cells. Lootable diamonds are secondary (alluvial) diamonds found, for example,
in river channels and marine deposits through the process of erosion from the
primary diamond deposits. The extraction of these diamonds does not require
sophisticated mining techniques, and they can be found in 360 grid-cells. Non-
lootable diamonds refer to primary (kimberlite or lamproite) diamond deposits
and are extracted with the help of substantial infrastructure and sophisticated
technology. Non-lootable diamonds are present in 87 of the African grid-cells.10
7Conflict areas are based on the PRIO-GRID coding whereby cells that intersect conflict
polygons and part of the country in conflict are shaded.
8The shapefile data unfortunately do not separate between fields with known production
and fields where this information is missing. In Africa overall, there are 95 oil fields with
only 49 providing information about known production. The start date is known for 28 fields
and for 25 of these production began before 1989 and an the estimated production life of an
oilfield is about 20-30 years (Lujala, Rød and Thieme, 2007; DCLG, 2014).
9In Africa, this effectively means cannabis produced for external markets, as there are
neither opium nor coca production reported in the region and small scale domestic production
is not picked up. Cannabis can be cultivated from the same spot for several years and illicit
exports of the drug began at the latest in the 1960s and has been reported to be on the
increase (Farrell, 1998; UNODC, 2007; Ellis, 2009).
10The data are limited to lootable and non-lootable diamonds with known production to
ensure that these locations are deemed valuable. Diamonds can be mined from the same site
for decades and thus we can assume that the impact these sites have on our conflict dynamics
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Figure 1
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3.3 Negotiation data
We code periods of ongoing negotiations using a combination of existing data
and new data collection. Our starting point is the information about mediated
talks provided by the Civil War Mediation dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch and
Pospieszna, 2011). In order to complement this data with non-mediated talks,
we use information from Harbom, Ho¨gbladh and Wallensteen (2006), Kreutz
(2012) and UCDP (2014). For cases where we still couldn’t confirm whether
talks were underway or not, we collected additional data which included iden-
tifying the month in which talks started - provided there had been at least one
calendar year of non-talks prior. In all of our analyses, Talks are coded as a
dichotomous variable.
3.4 Control variables
Since natural resources may not be the only thing influencing the timing and
the location choice for battles, we include several control variables in our estima-
tions. First, the size of the grid-cells (in square kilometers) may be important as
bigger grid-cells may facilitate more battle fatalities than smaller grid-cells. The
geography of the cell may impact the battle locations in terms of its distance to
strategic locations such as the capital city and state borders. Capital distance
captures the distance (in kilometers) from the cell centroid to the national cap-
ital city, whereas Contiguity is measured as the distance (in kilometers) from
the cell centroid to the border of the nearest contiguous neighboring country.
Conflict in neighbouring cells may also spill-over to battle fatalities in a given
grid-cell, which motivates an inclusion of spatial Conflict lag variable that indi-
cate the share of ongoing conflict among contiguous cells in the same country.
We also control for Population size since more populous areas might have more
over 20 years is constant.
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battle fatalities. The population estimates for the grid-cells are only available
in 5 year intervals from 1990-2005 and thus we interpolate an average for each
grid-cell year based in the existing data. All of the above mentioned control co-
variates are taken from the PRIO-GRID dataset (Tollefsen, Strand and Buhaug,
2012).
The conflict context may also influence belligerents capacity to engage in
battles so we control for the presence of external support. Government ex-
ternal captures military support from another state to the government side in
their fight against (any) present rebels, while Rebel external indicate the same
provided to (any) rebels. We also include a Duration variable of the time (in
days) since the first death in the conflict-dyad, calculated as of 31 December
for the year of observation. In countries with multiple active groups, the av-
erage duration is coded. We also control for Country fatalities by aggregating
all the fatalities for each country years. All these variables are obtained from
the UCDP-GED dataset (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). Finally, in order to
account for possible time dependency, we include a variable of Previous fatalities
in the grid-cell into our models.
3.5 Method
Our theoretical argument suggest that belligerents’ expectations regarding fu-
ture conflict duration influences whether they will fight in the immediate vicinity
of natural resources. The visible implication of this is that we expect relatively
less violence in natural resource areas when there are no talks and more violence
in natural resource areas during talks. We also expect to see a change in where
fighting occurs when talks are initiated as this indicates that parties re-evaluate
their expectations on the duration of conflict. Fighting should shift from pri-
marily non-resource areas to resource-rich areas. We empirically assess both
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these propositions, the first using yearly data, and the second with monthly
data around the time of the onset of talks.
Our dependent variable in all models is the number of battle-related deaths
in a grid-cell in a given time period. As this constitutes an over-dispersed count
variable, a negative binomial regression model is suitable (Hilbe, 2011).
For our yearly analysis, we split the sample between years without talks
(expected long duration) and years with talks (expected short duration), before
estimating the effect using an interaction effect of talks and natural resource
areas. We then zoom into the specific time period when talks are initiated as this
period should indicate a shift in warring parties expected duration of conflict and
the subsequent conflict trend. We disaggregate the data to monthly observations
for the 12 months prior and post every onset of talks.11 To identify if there is
an overall change in conflict dynamics when talks begin, we first estimate an
interrupted time series analysis (Wagner et al., 2002). Controlling for both auto-
regressive and moving average time trends, these models estimate the overall
effect of talks on conflict dynamics. Following a data-driven optimization of
the best fit of pre-and post- functional forms (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik,
2015), we employ the most common assumption of linear trends.
To explore whether we observe variation in the violence trends in areas
with or without natural resources, we estimate Difference-in-difference (D-i-D)
models for the same sliding time windows. D-i-D models are commonly used
for evaluating the change experienced after an intervention among a certain
group (the treatment group) in comparison to an non-treated similar group
(the control group) (Athey and Imbens, 2006). While there is no unaffected
‘control’ territory for our study, the theoretical argument suggest that conflict
violence will shift from areas without natural resources to areas with resources
11The actual ‘onset month’ is consistently excluded from the analysis as we don’t have daily
data on when talks were initiated.
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as talks begin meaning that the relative shift is of interest. The D-i-D design,
under mild continuity assumptions, provide us with a universe of cases that
are ex ante comparable in all other ways (on average) except the presence of
negotiations.
3.6 Robustness checks
Our online appendix reports a battery of robustness tests, including the use
of a dichotomous measure of battle occurrences (to control for high-violence
outliers), only mediated talks or those that result in a peace agreement, dis-
aggregating different natural resources, including yearly dummies and random
effects into our models, reconfiguring our data using nearest neighbour propen-
sity score matching, and testing for spatial dependencies using a spatial weighing
matrix.
4 Findings
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Table 3: Yearly analysis of natural resources, talks, and battle fatalities; split samples and interaction models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
No talks Talks No talks Talks No talks Talks Interaction Interaction Interaction, ZINB
Natural resources -0.732∗∗∗ 0.118 -0.732∗∗∗ 0.118 -0.732∗ 0.118 -0.735∗∗∗ -0.735∗∗∗ -0.715∗∗∗
(-4.71) (0.67) (-3.42) (0.52) (-2.26) (0.56) (-4.96) (-3.39) (-6.81)
Talks 0.890∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗ 0.860∗∗∗
(8.65) (8.29) (9.18)
Natural resourcesXTalks 0.607∗∗ 0.607 0.586∗
(2.77) (1.88) (2.47)
Cell area 0.0800 0.0272 0.0800 0.0272 0.0800 0.0272 0.0571 0.0571 0.0634
(0.69) (0.30) (0.59) (0.22) (0.30) (0.18) (0.64) (0.54) (0.84)
Govt external 0.994∗∗∗ -0.217 0.994∗∗∗ -0.217 0.994 -0.217 0.679∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗
(4.36) (-1.78) (3.95) (-1.57) (1.66) (-0.99) (4.41) (4.05) (5.64)
Rebel external 0.709∗ 0.405 0.709∗ 0.405 0.709∗∗ 0.405 0.669∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.650∗
(2.18) (1.73) (2.16) (1.67) (2.71) (1.89) (3.75) (3.43) (2.19)
Duration 0.165∗∗∗ -0.0935∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ -0.0935∗∗∗ 0.165 -0.0935∗ 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.0781∗∗ 0.0751∗∗∗
(4.32) (-3.75) (3.52) (-3.33) (0.90) (-2.33) (3.75) (3.21) (3.68)
Conflict lag 1.856∗∗∗ 0.584 1.856∗∗∗ 0.584 1.856∗∗∗ 0.584 1.870∗∗∗ 1.870∗∗∗ 1.831∗∗∗
(8.68) (1.78) (8.23) (1.70) (4.91) (1.86) (10.36) (9.49) (18.41)
Contiguity -2.217∗∗∗ -0.807 -2.217∗∗ -0.807 -2.217∗ -0.807 -1.953∗∗∗ -1.953∗∗∗ -1.921∗∗∗
(-3.40) (-1.83) (-3.21) (-1.54) (-2.25) (-1.25) (-3.90) (-3.65) (-6.93)
Capital distance -0.381 0.338∗ -0.381 0.338∗ -0.381 0.338 -0.187 -0.187 -0.185
(-1.77) (2.20) (-1.68) (2.06) (-0.92) (1.49) (-1.13) (-1.06) (-1.68)
Country fatalities 0.312∗∗ 0.0938∗∗∗ 0.312∗ 0.0938∗ 0.312 0.0938∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(2.70) (4.21) (2.45) (2.56) (1.34) (2.30) (5.55) (3.59) (5.04)
Population size -0.0289 0.0225 -0.0289 0.0225 -0.0289 0.0225 -0.00190 -0.00190 -0.00476
(-1.78) (1.69) (-1.36) (1.30) (-0.84) (0.96) (-0.14) (-0.09) (-0.44)
Previous fatalities 3.177∗∗∗ 1.486∗∗∗ 3.177∗∗ 1.486 3.177∗ 1.486 2.380∗∗∗ 2.380∗∗ 2.606∗∗∗
(4.70) (4.56) (2.72) (1.81) (2.40) (1.71) (6.52) (2.64) (12.95)
Constant -0.0748 2.784∗∗∗ -0.0748 2.784∗∗∗ -0.0748 2.784∗∗∗ 0.180 0.180 0.220
(-0.20) (6.68) (-0.17) (5.54) (-0.07) (3.84) (0.65) (0.55) (0.90)
Standard errors Robust Robust Clust. grid Clust. grid Clust. country Clust. country Robust Clust. grid
lnalpha
Constant 2.128∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗ 2.128∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗ 2.128∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗ 1.764∗∗∗ 1.764∗∗∗ 1.689∗∗∗
(45.91) (24.68) (27.90) (14.25) (5.00) (4.51) (50.87) (28.38) (44.10)
inflate
Country -0.00841∗∗∗
(-3.40)
Constant 1.312
(0.98)
N 3302 1066 3302 1066 3302 1066 4368 4368 4368
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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4.1 Yearly analysis
Table 3 present the results from our negative binomial regressions with the
yearly data, focusing on the count of grid-cell fatalities in conflict countries.
Models 1 and 2 show the split sample estimates with robust standard errors,
Models 3 & 4 use standard errors clustered at the grid-cell level, while Models
5 & 6 use country level clustering of standard errors. Across all models, the
results consistently support the expected relationship in our first hypothesis
that there is less fighting close to natural resources in years when there are
no talks underway. The negative correlation between natural resources and
violence in no-talks years (Models 1, 3 & 5) is statistically significant on at least
0.05 level. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between natural resources
and violence in the years when talks are underway (Models 2, 4 & 6) which is
in line with our second hypothesis but the relationship is not not statistically
significant at commonly accepted confidence levels.
In Models 7-9, we explore the interaction of talks and natural resources on
the overall level of grid-cell yearly violence. When we estimate the relationship
with robust standard errors (Model 7), or using a Zero-Inflated Negative Bi-
nomial regression (Model 9),12 we find that while natural resources in general
have a negative impact on battle fatalities, when interacted with talks there is
increased battle fatalities in these areas. When standard errors are clustered on
the grid-cell (Model 8), the statistical significance of the interaction is reduced
to the 0.1 level although the direction of the relationship remains.
The control variables in our models behave largely as have been found in
previous research, which suggest that there are few reasons to be concerned
about model specifications. A history of previous high-intensity fighting in-
12It can be assumed that the excess zeroes in our data are generated from two different
processes: grid-cells in conflict zones without battle fatalities, and grid-cells outside the conflict
zone.
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creases the risk of subsequent battle deaths, both within a specific grid-cell and
in the country as a whole. Battle fatalities are higher in locations closer to
capital cities when talks are underway (Butcher, 2015), while areas closer to
the border experience less fighting when there are no talks. External support
for the government and rebels predicts more battle fatalities when there are
no talks, corresponding with the finding that external support prolongs conflict
duration (Cunningham, 2010). Finally, we find that longer running conflicts are
more violent when there are no talks, while they are less violent when talks are
underway. The latter may be an effect of war fatigue making belligerents in
protracted struggles particularly interested in ending the war.
Figure 2 demonstrate the substantive effects of natural resources and vi-
olence, using Clarify (Tomz et al., 2003) to identify first difference estimates
of yearly battle deaths when moving from grid-cells without natural resources
to ones with natural resources during and outside peace talks. The baseline
probability of battle fatalities regardless of talks indicate that there is overall
less fighting near natural resources. In these areas, the average prediction is 4
battle-deaths per year, which is only half of the 8 average predicted fatalities
per year in grid-cells without natural resources. This finding is similar as the
conclusions of Maystadt et al. (2014, 723) that in the Democratic Republic of
Congo ‘valuable minerals do foster conflict, but not in the immediate neigh-
bourhood of the mining sites where violence would disrupt the profitability of
the business.’
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Figure 2: First difference of natural resources without/with talks
When we split the samples between periods where belligerents expect the
conflict to continue uninterrupted and when they suspect that it may be soon
ending, the patterns are substantively different. Figure 2A illustrates the first
differences graphically in conflict situations without talks, whereas Figure 2B
illustrates the same in conflict situations with talks. A binary operationalization
of the natural resource variable was used in generating these graphs. Figure 2A
confirms that the first difference between areas with or without natural resources
when no peace talks are underway is -2.30 with a 95% confidence interval be-
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Table 4: Parameter estimates from segmented regression models for average
monthly battle deaths/grid: 3, 6, 9, and 12 months prior and post peace talk
onset.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
+/- 3 months +/- 6 months +/- 9 months +/- 12 months
Intercept -3.876 2.111 2.105∗∗∗ 2.442∗∗∗
(-1.33) (1.34) (3.58) (10.05)
Baseline trend 0.795∗∗ 0.192 0.192∗ 0.149∗∗
(2.62) (1.08) (2.34) (3.22)
Level change after talks -1.713 -2.002∗∗ -1.677∗∗ -1.062
(-1.77) (-2.68) (-2.84) (-1.96)
Trend change after talks -1.433∗∗∗ 0.0610 -0.0521 -0.118
(-3.88) (0.28) (-0.46) (-1.68)
N 6518 11963 18136 23824
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
tween -3.34 and -1.13. Figure 2B, however, shows that during peace talks, areas
with natural resources experience approximately 11 more battle fatalities than
areas without resources, but the effect is not statistically significant according to
conventional levels. The 95% confidence interval ranges from -12.12 to 43.31.13
4.2 Monthly analysis
Our theory posits that when the expected duration of conflict changes, then we
expect to see a shift in the spatial distribution of violence. To explore this, we
employ grid-cell-month data for the time period of 12 months before and after
talks begin in a conflict. If talks ends and at least 12 months passes until they
resume, we include the second episode of talks also as an onset.
Table 4 present a series of Interrupted Time Series estimations, indicating
the average overall trend of violence per grid around the time that negotiations
are initiated in a conflict. The baseline trend indicates that the general trend for
conflicts is of escalation, leading to on average almost 0.8 more fatalities per grid-
cell month during the temporal window of 3 months prior and 3 months after
talks begins, and 0.15 fatalities for the 12 months prior/post talks onset. That
the size of the effect decreases is not surprising given that the violent dynamics
after talks will differ sharply between cases when conflict is resolved, and cases
when negotiations fail and renewed fighting flares up. When looking at the
13Alternative illustrations (Figures 4 & 5) with density estimates of natural resources during
and outside peace talks are included in the web appendix.
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effect of the level change and the trend change after talks, we can conclude that
talks are having a clear impact on conflict dynamics. The direct effect of talks
is an overall reduction of violence (level change) which is statistically significant
at least at the 0.1 level in all models. Similarly, the short-term dynamics of
the conflict is also affected with 1.4 fatalities less per grid-cell month after talks
are initiated, even if the trend when analyzing longer windows regresses to the
mean. That the overall trend is positive, but the post-talks trend is negative
can be interpreted as that conflicts on average are becoming more violent until
negotiations begin, suggesting that warring sides are re-evaluating their ability
to maintain the war effort as it becomes more costly. We can also conclude
from this analysis that the findings from the yearly analyses were not overly
influenced by reverse causality. Fighting in general does not increase in the
aftermath of talks.
Natural resources
Talks
Natural resources * talks
−4 −2 0 2 4
+/− 3 months +/− 6 months
+/− 9 months +/−12 months
Negative binomial regression analysis, grid−cell fixed effects
Figure 3: Difference-in-differences estimation of battle deaths/grid: 3, 6, 9, and
12 months prior and post peace talk onset.
Having identified an effect of talks on conflict dynamics, we explore to what
extent the fighting during talks increasingly occurs in the vicinity of natural
resources. To do this, we estimate a series of difference-in-difference analyses.
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Figure 3 present the findings from comparisons of cell violence using the same
sliding window of 3, 6, 9, and 12 months prior and post the onset of talks. All
estimations control for possible confounds by fixed effects on the grid-cell level.
The relative increase in violence in natural resource areas after talks is great-
est in the smallest window with between 2 and 3 battle deaths more per cell
per month. The effect decreases to just over 1 fatality per grid-cell-month for
the comparison of the six months periods, and it decreased further as the win-
dow increases and conflict dynamic regresses to the mean. While a difference
of two to three fatalities per cell-month may seem a limited effect, it should be
noted this analysis is based on very fine-grained data. For example, one of the
geographically smallest conflicts in our sample, Sierra Leone, experienced fight-
ing in 30 different grid-cells which means that extrapolating this effect means a
possible shift in violence of over 400 battle-related deaths in a year. This clearly
constitutes an amount of violence with the potential to derail a peace process.
The combined findings from the yearly and monthly analysis provide us with
substantive information with regards to our theory on belligerent expectations
of war duration and strategic decisions about where to fight. The identified
trends are in line with our argument about the importance of areas with and
without natural resources, but the yearly analysis shows that the effect may be
relative rather than absolute. The observed shift consist primarily of a large
reduction of fighting in areas without natural resources after talks begin, while
the increase of violence close to resources at that point is not statistically sig-
nificant. This indicates that even in the time periods when natural resources
are more contested, warring parties are careful to limit the violence in the area
to avoid disrupting the local war economy.
How generalizable are these findings? While we cannot predict how much
violence will occur in natural resource rich areas when warring parties expect
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the conflict to end soon, we should see the expected violence patterns in an
out-of-sample (both temporally and geographically) high profile peace process.
The civil war in Colombia is a prominent example of a natural resource-fuelled
‘irregular civil war’ (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). Before the peace talks from
2012-2016, representatives of the state, their (former) paramilitary allies, and
the left-wing rebel groups FARC and smaller guerrilla groups, all captured nat-
ural resource rents in the form of bribes and/or extortion, but the competition
over resources was rarely violent, expect over oil or narco-trafficking (Lavaux,
2007; Jonsson, 2014). There was not much active collaboration between parties
to acquire resource income, but any actor forced to give up one income could
substitute the loss by expanding its share from another resource (Peceny and
Durnan, 2006; Dube and Vargas, 2013). While the overall level of conflict related
violence decreased as the peace process progressed, from 776 FARC attacks and
clashes in 2013 to 619 in 2014, 338 in 2015, and 18 in 2016 respectively (CERAC,
2017), the decrease was not evenly distributed across the country. Rettberg and
Ortiz-Riomalo (2016) find that FARC became increasingly active in gold min-
ing areas after talks were initiated, and there is an overall increase in violence
during these years in the Pacific cocaine hub of Tumaco, along drug-trafficking
routes in Choc, and in contraband zones along the Venezuelan border (ICG,
2017). Thus, the trajectory of spatial violence during Colombia is similar to
our findings from African civil wars 1989-2008, with increasing violence near
natural resources when a civil war is ending.
5 Conclusion
This article presents a theoretical logic for the strategic calculations of bel-
ligerents’ use of violence in natural resource-rich areas depending on expected
conflict duration. We argue that when warring parties expect a protracted con-
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flict, they limit fighting in natural resource-rich areas. Because the taxation
of natural resources is important for maintaining necessary capabilities to con-
tinue the war, they are concerned about disturbing this economic activity. We
contend that these areas are instead likely to see the kind of ‘war-time political
orders’ where belligerents develop tacit co-operation (Staniland, 2012).
This political order is formed on the basis of self-interest and mutual reward
for local commanders, meaning that shifts in the overall wartime strategy are
likely to result in shifting spatial conflict dynamics. One particular strategic
shift occurs when parties expect that the conflict is not protracted but is drawing
to a close - such as when peace negotiations are underway. Then the acceptance
of partial income from taxing natural resource trade becomes less important
than capturing a greater share of control of this resource in the expected post-
conflict society. This means that relative to non-resource-rich areas, parties are
expected to focus their contest over resources when the end of conflict is more
likely.
Following an analysis of the spatial variation of violence in African civil wars
1989-2008, we find that natural resource-rich areas experience less violence when
conflicting parties are expecting a protracted fight. When belligerents expect
that the conflict is about to end, however, there is more violence around natural
resources. We find this also in a monthly analysis of the dynamics of violence,
specifically as negotiations begin, providing evidence of a clear shift in the spatial
distribution of conflict violence.
Our findings draw attention to a dilemma for peacemakers: while the preva-
lence of natural resources offers economic potential that could be used for re-
building a war-torn society, these areas are most contested just as the conflict is
drawing to a close. Thus, the locations with the greatest potential for providing
a peace dividend may be destroyed for that very reason. While a recent study
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has found that the deployment of peacekeepers restricts contagion of conflict
activity (Beardsley and Gleditsch, 2015), we know little about how belligerents
use their geographically disaggregated forces already in place. Our findings sug-
gest that it is important to deploy peacekeepers close to natural resources rather
than where previous conflict activity has occurred.
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